Cover of: Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns | Robert Gibbons Read Online
Share

Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence by Robert Gibbons

  • 921 Want to read
  • ·
  • 3 Currently reading

Published by Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementRobert Gibbons, Kevin J. Murphy
SeriesWorking paper / Department of Economics -- Number 563, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 563.
ContributionsMurphy, Kevin James, 1957-, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
The Physical Object
Pagination48 p. :
Number of Pages48
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL24637267M
OCLC/WorldCa23098253

Download Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns

PDF EPUB FB2 MOBI RTF

Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, [] (OCoLC) Material Type: Internet resource: Document Type: Book, Internet Resource: All Authors / Contributors: Robert Gibbons; Kevin J Murphy; National Bureau of Economic Research. Get this from a library! Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence. [Kevin J Murphy; Robert Gibbons; National Bureau of Economic Research.;] -- This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career . Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence Book Review. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. FROM THE JOURNAL. Print the sales sheet: Journal of Political Economy. MOST READ. Of all published articles, the following were the most read within the past 12 months. Liquidity, Business Cycles, and. () "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence", Journal of Political Economy, , Murphy, Kevin. () "Performance Measurement and Appraisal: Motivating Managers to Identify and Reward Performance", Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, Harvard Business School Press.

"Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence" (with Robert Gibbons). Journal of Political Economy (June ). [Reprinted in The Economics of Executive Compensation (K. J. Murphy and K. Hallock, eds.) (Edward Elgar Publishing, ).].   The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts. Rafael Tenorio. Journal of Sports Economics 1: 4, Share. The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts Show all authors. Rafael Tenorio. Rafael Tenorio. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns. Journal of Political Economy, , Cited by: Robert Gibbons, Kevin Murphy () "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy , Kevin Murphy () "Performance Measurement and Appraisal: Motivating Managers to Identify and Reward Performance," Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives Harvard. Theoretical work by Holmstrom (), not specifically in the context of money management, is also related: he shows that managerial career concerns have incentive effects, but these do not.

Gibbons, R. and K. Murphy, , Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence, The Journal of Political Economy , Greene, W., Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Guay, W., , The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude andCited by: “Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts Article in SSRN Electronic Journal 43(1) September with 21 Reads How we measure 'reads'. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Con-cerns: Theory and Evidence Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy Internal Net Worth and the Investment Process: An Applica-tion to U.S. Agriculture R. Glenn Hubbard and Anil K. Kashyap The Determinants of Black-White Differences in Early Em-.   This paper uses the quarterly conference call as a disclosure metric to examine whether firms with less informative financial statements are more likely to respond by providing additional voluntary disclosure. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm's information environment, I find a significant inverse relation between measures of the informativeness of a Cited by: